Forrest Cameranesi Geek of all Trades

Codex Quaerentis reorganization outline

Old version here.

• Introduction
  • Guided journey through entire world of philosophy
  • Novel system for professionals and recap of discourse for novices; something useful in either case
  • Four core essays:
    • Metaphilosophical conclusions (why philosophy matters and what it is),
    • Metaphilosophical analysis (from the outside in, from the inside out, and both forward and backward across time),
    • Philosophical analysis (extremely moderate approach, between objectivism and subjectivism, rationalism and fideism),
    • Philosophical conclusions (natural sciences are better than what we did before, and nurtural sciences would be better than what we do now).
    Metaphilosophical analysis the greatest analytic novelty here, with nurtural sciences the biggest underdeveloped piece of that picture, and thus the most practical takeaway here.
  • Then topic-by-topic breakdown from the meaning of life to the meaning of words
  • Apology for audacity
• The Basics
  • The Metaphilosophy of Analytic Pragmatism
    • Conclusions
      • Why is philosophy useful?
        • Distantly instrumental to all endeavors
          • All work
            • uses tools
            • to do jobs
          • Administration
            • Technologists administer tools
            • Businesspeople administer jobs
          • Creation
            • Engineers create technologies
            • Entrepreneurs create businesses
          • Sciences
            • Physical sciences inform engineering
            • Ethical sciences should inform entrepreneurship
          • Philosophy undergirds both the physical and ethical sciences
            • Ontology, epistemology, etc undergird the physical sciences
            • Axiology, deontology, etc undergird the ethical sciences
          (including start of current Introduction > Motivation)
        • Also intrinsic practice at being a person
          "Martial arts for the mind and will"
          
          (including current Introduction > Overview > Dogen and infection stuff)
      • Can philosophy get done at all?
        • Yes, it has: the physical sciences (separating education and the investigation of truth from religion, and connecting the learning of deep truths to the development of practical technologies) are both mostly logically mustered and mostly rhetorically disseminated
        • And it still can more: the ethical sciences (separating governance and the accomplishment of good from state, and connecting the achievement of high goods to the development of practical businesses) are only haphazardly progressing in both their mustering and dissemination
      • What does it take to do philosophy?
        • Consciousness, curiosity, and bracketing (to do the logical mustering of philosophical solutions)
        • Agency, courage, and serenity (to do the rhetorical dissemination of those solutions to an unreceptive world)
        These are both the muscles needed to do it and those that will get grown by doing it.
        (including current Introduction > Overview > maybe hopeless but trying anyway?)
      • How is philosophy to be done?
        • Analytically and pragmatically
        • Historically (where it's coming from) and dialectically (where that's all going)
        (including current Introduction > History, and Introduction > Motivation > "tried on")
      • Who is to do philosophy?
        • Everyone (disseminating) and professionals (mustering)
        • Generalists (disseminating) and specialists (mustering)
        (including current Introduction > Motivation > dependencies, parallel solutions)
      • What even is philosophy?
        The investigation of broad and fundamental things
        But demarcation problem
        • Not religion
        • Not sophistry
        • Not science
        • Not politics
        • Not math
        • Not art
        None of those, but rather the bridge from the abstract arts and mathematics, to the physical and ethical sciences; from abstract to concrete, and descriptive and prescriptive. About useful ways of talking about things, or rather avoiding counter-productive ways of talking about things, like either religion or sophistry; productive or useful toward the ability to tell superior answer from inferior ones, which is wisdom, which philosophy is the love or pursuit of.
        (therefore... current Introduction > Overview > that common error + the general worldview + my phil is the view that ...)
    • Arguments
      • The Four Aspects (of "meaning?")
        
        Derivative of Aristotle's four "causes"
        But not actually based directly on that; just two dichotomies found repeatedly all across philosophy.
        • Hylomorphism
          
          Potential-actual distinction
          Ideal-material distinction
          Noumenal-phenomenal distinction
          Essential-existential distinction
          Quiddity-haecceity distinction
          Morphic-hylic distinction
          
          Basically stems all the way back to Thales, the first instance of supposing everything may be different forms of the same material. He said water; Anaximander said instead no particular known material, but some indefinite, or boundless, stuff. Pythagoras effectively said why bother with materials at all if there's no distinctions between them: it's all just forms. For my part I think Pythagoras more or less nailed it in three.
          • Potential
            • Form is external connection
              (presages prescriptive)
            • Structure is internal connection
              (presages descriptive)
            • Function is through-connection, external to internal to external, and synchronic identity
              (presages indexical)
            Linguistic meaning as graphs of connections between forms or within structures
            No distinction between invention and discovery yet
          • Actual
            • Input to our functions as experience
            • Output from our functions as behavior
            • Reflexive internal function, self-experience and self-behavior, as diachronic identity
            Practical meaning as indexical connection through our own function
            Distinction between invention and discovery arises
          Form is the experience of function
          Function is the behavior of structure
          Structure is the reflexion of form
          
          We can take formless, functionless, structureless "atoms" (of, say, empty sets), and reflexively build structures out of them, which structures can behave in functional ways, the experiences of which functions are forms, which can be built into still further structures.
        • Direction of fit
          
          Descriptive-prescriptive distinction
          Is-ought distinction
          Fact-norm distinction
          
          Plato's demiurge/phytourge, "artificial"/"natural", distinction. "It was made to do this" vs "it did this on its own".
          • Descriptive
            • Potential inputs restrict the actual (the past restricts the present, us): it makes us be this way
            • If our model and the world don't match, our model is to be changed based on our experiences to match the world (which does not preclude us also changing the world through our behaviors)
            • Doing so gives us the tools by which we in the present can direct the future (the actual restricting potential outputs): it is the source of our power, how we do anything
            The relationship across which potentials actualize things is causation.
            
            Reality is the cause of experiences, and behaviors are the cause of reality.
            
            Understanding the rules is what gives us the tools by which we obtain power.
          • Prescriptive
            • The actual restricts potential inputs (we, the present, restrict the past): it lets us to be this way
            • If our model and the world don't match, the world is to be changed through our behavior to match our model (which does not preclude us also changing our model based on our experiences)
            • Doing so is the job toward which the future directs us in the present (potential outputs restricting the actual): it is the source of our responsibility, why we do anything
            The relationship across which things actualize their potentials is purpose
            
            Morality is the purpose of behaviors, and experiences are the purpose of morality.
            
            Accepting our responsibilities is what gets done the jobs through which we achieve our goals.
          To have the power to achieve our goals, we must understand the rules and accept our responsibilities.
        Before considering the intersection of description and prescription, this leaves us with four domains:
        • The potential descriptive: mathematics, where we pick a few arbitrary rules and see what we can derive from them
        • The potential prescriptive: the arts, where we pick a few arbitrary goals and see what we can integrate into them
        • The actual descriptive: the physical sciences, where we are given many things and see what we can derive them from
        • The actual prescriptive: the ethical sciences, where we are given many things and see what we can integrate them into
        But description and prescription can each be considered their own subsets, which then adds four more domains to this picture.
      • The Eight Domains
        We can map the intersections of all three of these subsets of the ideas onto the surface of a sphere, ringing the borders of each around its equator and two orthogonal meridians, respectively. This gives us eight domains of consideration, each one an octant of the surface of the sphere.
        • One octant represents the domain of ideas considered with concern for their indexicality -- for how they actually matter in this particular functional chain -- as well as both their descriptivity and prescriptivity, with how they are restricted by both their inputs and by their outputs. This is the domain of work, of all practical activities.
        • Two sides of that octant border other octants that each respectively represent the domains of ideas still considered with concern for their indexicality, for whether they actually matter in any particular functional chain. but with concern for only one of their descriptivity or prescriptivity -- for whether they are restricted by their inputs, or instead by their outputs. These are the domains of the physical and ethical sciences.
        • Those two octants in turn jointly border the fourth octant on that hemisphere, the domain of ideas considered with concern for their descriptivity and prescriptivity both -- for how they are restricted by both their inputs and by their outputs -- but now without concern for their indexicality, for whether they actually matter in any particular functional chain. This is the domain of philosophy, considering both the true and the good, reality and morality, but in an abstract and general matter detached from any particular practical concerns.
        • That in turn borders, along with one each of the two preceding octants of the physical and ethical sciences, the domains of ideas considered with similar concern for their descriptivity or prescriptivity separately -- for how they are restricted by their inputs, or by their outputs -- but like philosophy, without concern for their indexicality, for whether they actually matter in any particular functional chain. These are the domains of math and the arts.
        • And those in turn jointly border the octant exactly opposite the one we began with, the domain of ideas considered without concern for their descriptivity, prescriptivity, or indexicality: those that are neither restricted by their inputs, restricted by their outputs, nor restricted by whether they actually matter in any particular functional chain. This is the domain of pure language, for which we can invent any arbitrary rules, and which we can use toward any arbitrary goal, connecting to mathematics via logic's focus on applying syntactical rules of language, and to the arts via rhetoric's focus on attaining pragmatic goals of language.
        • Altogether these form a ring of six octants -- from language, through descriptive and prescriptive topics, both abstract and practical, all the way around to work -- surrounding the central octant of philosophy. But if that ring is thought of as the edge of a coin, with philosophy as one face of it, then the other face of that coin, exactly opposite philosophy, is the final octant, the domain of ideas considered with concern for their indexicality -- for how they actually matter in this particular functional chain -- but without concern for their descriptivity or prescriptivity, for whether they are restricted by their inputs and by their outputs. This is the domain of concrete action in the actual world, but without limits either on how to do it or why to do it, where the goals and the rules are as made up as those of pure language: the domain of play, of games.
        Every game is defined by its rules and its goals, as well as its players and its judges. The notions of rules and of goals correspond to the powers and responsibilities of the descriptive and prescriptive domains, exhibiting a nondual pattern that shows up throughout philosophy, such as in modality: rules concern what is impossible/impermissible or possible/permissible, setting out what tools players can (or can't) use; while goals concern what is necessary/obligatory or contingent/omissible, setting out what jobs they must (or don't have to) do. Many of the relations between different fields above can be framed therefore as parts of games:
        • Language is a game with its syntax as its tools and its pragmatics as its job; math is consequently the sub-game concerning the rules of language, and the arts are the sub-game concerning the goals of language.
        • Work is a game with reality as it tools and morality as its job; the physical sciences are consequently the sub-game concerning the rules of work, and the ethical sciences are the sub-game concerning the goals of work.
        Play, meanwhile, inherently produces what is effectively linguistic meaning, as 'moves' in whatever games we produce -- be they literal body movements, sounds we make, scratches in the dirt or on rocks or wood or paper, tokens of some kind we move about, whatever -- take on significance, importance, meaning (semantics), from the rules we apply to them (a syntax) and the goals we pursue with them (a pragmatics).
        
        And also, as we are thrown into the world, we discover that in order to be free to do that kind of language-inventing play, there is a mandatory game we must play, the game of life, of work, where we are not told the rules or the goals but we will still fail and never get to play anything again if we don't figure them out and then attain those goals within the confines of those rules.
        
        That makes playing, in general, itself a kind of meta-game, where the goal is effectively to produce language, to create meaning, and the rule is you have to do the work to enable yourself to keep playing.
        
        Meanwhile, on the other side of the coin, the philosophy side, we can frame the whole philosophical endeavor as a similar kind of meta-game, the game whose goal is to enable work to be done, to serve the jobs of the physical and ethical sciences, and whose rule is to operate within the confines of language, to use the tools math and the arts, logic and rhetoric -- all of that ultimately using the tool of play, in its language-creating capacity, to do the job of play, inasmuch as it is enabled by work.
      • The Sixteen Topics
        
        If we thus delve deeper into the sub-games of philosophy, and the sub-games thereof, and so on deeper into the details, we should be able to find both all of jobs set out before philosophy, all of the questions it is supposed to answer, as well as all of the tools at its disposal, all of the means of answering such questions:
        
        Level 1:
        The split of abstract potentiality of language from concrete actuality of work.
        • Philosophy ...
          • ... serves the jobs / goals / objects of work
          • ... uses the tools / rules / methods of language
        Level 2:
        The split into descriptive and prescriptive.
        • [Philosophy]
          • Work ...
            • ... serves the jobs / goals / objects of the ethical sciences
            • ... uses the tools / rules / methods of the physical sciences
          • Language ...
            • ... serves the jobs / goals / objects of the arts
            • ... uses the tools / rules / methods of mathematics
        Level 3:
        The split into entities and methods.
        • [Philosophy]
          • [Work]
            • The ethical sciences ...
              • ... serve the jobs / goals / objects of morality(?)
              • ... use the tools / rules / methods of justice(?)
            • The physical sciences ...
              • ... serve the jobs / goals / objects of reality(?)
              • ... use the tools / rules / methods of knowledge(?)
          • [Language]
            • The arts ...
              • ... serve the jobs / goals / objects of integrability(?)
              • ... use the tools / rules / methods of concordance(?)
            • Mathematics ...
              • ... serves the jobs / goals / objects of derivability(?)
              • ... uses the tools / rules / methods of coherence(?)
        Level 4:
        The split of what from who, objects from subjects, reasons/methods from fiduciaries/institutions.
        • [Philosophy]
          • [Work]
            • [The ethical sciences]
              • Morality(?) ...
                • ... serves the jobs / goals / objects of axiology
                • ... uses the tools / rules / methods of will
              • Justice(?) ...
                • ... serves the jobs / goals / objects of deontology
                • ... uses the tools / rules / methods of governance
            • [The physical sciences]
              • Reality(?) ...
                • ... serves the jobs / goals / objects of ontology
                • ... uses the tools / rules / methods of mind
              • Knowledge(?) ...
                • ... serves the jobs / goals / objects of epistemology
                • ... uses the tools / rules / methods of education
          • [Language]
            • [The arts]
              • Integrability(?) ...
                • ... serves the jobs / goals / objects of integrability(?)
                • ... uses the tools / rules / methods of creativeness
              • Concordance(?) ...
                • ... serves the jobs / goals / objects of concordance(?)
                • ... uses the tools / rules / methods of daring(?)
            • [Mathematics]
              • Derivability(?) ...
                • ... serves the jobs / goals / objects of derivability(?)
                • ... uses the tools / rules / methods of explorativeness(?)
              • Coherence(?) ...
                • ... serves the jobs / goals / objects of coherence(?)
                • ... uses the tools / rules / methods of audacity(?)
        Level 5:
        The split along lines of actuality and potentiality, concrete and abstract, etc
        • [Philosophy]
          • [Work]
            • [The ethical sciences]
              • [Morality(?)]
                • Axiology ...
                  • ... serves the jobs / goals / objects of predicative value
                  • ... uses the tools / rules / methods of attributive value
                • Will ...
                  • ... serves the jobs / goals / objects of dispositional agency
                  • ... uses the tools / rules / methods of regulative agency
              • [Justice(?)]
                • Deontology
                  • ... serves the jobs / goals / objects of distributive justice
                  • ... uses the tools / rules / methods of procedural justice
                • Governance ...
                  • ... serves the jobs / goals / objects of resource distribution
                  • ... uses the tools / rules / methods of political legitimacy
            • [The physical sciences]
              • [Reality(?)]
                • Ontology ...
                  • ... serves the jobs / goals / objects of concrete existence
                  • ... uses the tools / rules / methods of abstract existence
                • Mind ...
                  • ... serves the jobs / goals / objects of phenomenal consciousness
                  • ... uses the tools / rules / methods of access consciousness
              • [Knowledge(?)]
                • Epistemology ...
                  • ... serves the jobs / goals / objects of synthetic truth
                  • ... uses the tools / rules / methods of analytic truth
                • Education ...
                  • ... serves the jobs / goals / objects of information distribution
                  • ... uses the tools / rules / methods of academic legitimacy
          • [Language]
            • [The arts]
              • [Integrability(?)]
                • Integrability(?) ...
                  • ... serves the jobs / goals / objects of minimizing servility
                  • ... uses the tools / rules / methods of maximizing utility
                • Creativeness ...
                  • ... serves the jobs / goals / objects of artistic imagination(?)
                  • ... uses the tools / rules / methods of artistic literacy(?)
              • [Concordance(?)]
                • Concordance(?) ...
                  • ... serves the jobs / goals / objects of cooperation
                  • ... uses the tools / rules / methods of independence
                • Daring(?) ...
                  • ... serves the jobs / goals / objects of courage
                  • ... uses the tools / rules / methods of serenity
            • [Mathematics]
              • [Derivability(?)]
                • Derivability(?) ...
                  • ... serves the jobs / goals / objects of minimizing necessity
                  • ... uses the tools / rules / methods of maximizing sufficiency
                • Explorativeness(?) ...
                  • ... serves the jobs / goals / objects of mathematical imagination(?)
                  • ... uses the tools / rules / methods of mathematical literacy(?)
              • [Coherence(?)]
                • Coherence(?) ...
                  • ... serves the jobs / goals / objects of completeness
                  • ... uses the tools / rules / methods of consistency
                • Audacity(?) ...
                  • ... serves the jobs / goals / objects of curiosity
                  • ... uses the tools / rules / methods of bracketing
      • All of this hinges on time:
        • the potential is all eternal, timeless
        • the actual is the temporal, seen from a particular time
        • the descriptive is defined by the past restricting the future
        • the prescriptive is defined by the future restricting the past
        There are multiple ways to construe time in terms of informational entropy, partial orderings across the abstract space of forms/functions/structures, with the two extremes of those ways corresponding to descriptive and prescriptive orderings (a way things will go if they must, and a way things would go if they could) which can thus be framed in terms of rules and goals too (the overarching rule is max-entropy always increases, and the overarching goal is to increase min-entropy); and the spectrum of them orthogonal to each other presages the core principle of commensurablism.
  • The Philosophy of Commensurablism
    • Arguments
      • Introduction > Overview > the general worldview...
      • Pragmatism: trying, vs giving up
        (adapted from current section "Pragmatic Justificiation")
      • First synthesis: meliorism, vs narrow optimism, objectivism+fideism (dogmatic occultism) or narrow pessimism, rationalism+subjectivism (relativist skepticism)
        (adapted from part of current section "The Opposition")
      • Second synthesis: "commensurablism" qua critico-liberal universal phenomenalism (broad objectivism, broad subjectivism, broad rationalism, and broad fideism), vs "modernism" qua occult skepticism (narrow objectivism and narrow fideism), or "postmodernism" qua dogmatic relativism (narrow rationalism and narrow subjectivism)
        (adapted from most of current essay and the other part of current section "The Opposition")
        • Narrow subjectivism (rejected for broad objectivism):
          subject-dependence of reasons every reason is dependent on some subject for all R, for some S, Rx<->Sx
        • Broad subjectivism (accepted over narrow objectivism):
          subject-accessibility of reasons every reason is accessible to some subject for all R, for some S, Rx->Sx
        • Narrow rationalism (rejected for broad fideism):
          reason-dependence of subjects every subject must be dependent on some reason for all S, for some R, [](Sx<->Rx)
        • Broad rationalism (accepted over narrow fideism):
          reason-responsiveness of subjects every subject must be responsive to some reason (?) for all S, for some R, [](Sx<-Rx) (?)
      • Here in the middle, mention the analogy of
        objectivism : subjectivism : fideism : rationalism
        ::
        objects : subjects : fiduciaries (institutions) : reasons (methods)
        ::
        goals : players : judges : rules ;
        times the four different 'games' to apply that to, the physical and ethical sciences as well as mathematics and the arts.
      • Applying this to both descriptive and prescriptive questions, vs both scientism and constructivism politicism from current essay "On Cynicism", and parts of intro.
        
        Scientism is commensurablist about reality, but erroneously therefore incommensurablist about morality, supposedly because the good is not mind-independently existent, and existence-free objective reasoning seems incoherent
        • axial universalism seems ontologically occult
          
          (saying there is objective morality sounds like you're claiming something non-empirical, the good, is existent)
        • and deontic criticism thus seems epistemically skeptical
          
          (saying some things are actually bad sounds like an epistemic limit, with no real basis, on thinking they're good)
        So contrapositively:
        • axial relativism seems required by ontic phenomenalism
          
          (saying that morality is just things seeming good to you)
        • and deontic dogmatism seems required by epistemic liberalism
          
          (saying that you're free to think that anything is good)
        But the same distorted view also applies in reverse: politicism is commensurablist about morality, but erroneously therefore incommensurablist about reality, supposedly because the truth is not will-independently valuable, and value-free objective reasoning seems incoherent
        • ontic universalism seems axiologically occult
          
          (saying there is objective reality sounds like you're claiming something non-hedonic, the truth, is valuable)
        • and epistemic criticism thus seems deontically skeptical
          
          (saying some things are actually false sounds like a deontic limit, with no moral basis, on thinking they're true)
        So contrapositively:
        • axial relativism seems required by ontic phenomenalism
          
          (saying that reality is just things seeming true to you)
        • and epistemic dogmatism seems required by deontic liberalism
          
          (saying that you're free to think that anything is true)
        Cover factual qua objective / normative qua reasoned-methodical X factual qua description / normative qua prescription here.
        
        Name alternate forms of each principle and anti-principle:
        • • ontic universalism or "realism" vs ontic relativism
          • axial universalism or "moralism" vs axial relativism
        • • ontic phenomenalism or "empiricism" vs ontic occultism
          • axial phenomenalism or "hedonism" vs axial occultism
        • • epistemic criticism vs epistemic dogmatism
          • deontic criticism vs deontic dogmatism
        • • epistemic liberalism vs epistemic skepticism
          • deontic liberalism vs deontic skepticism
      • And applying to both indexical and non-indexical questions, vs "materialism" or "idealism", a la "third synthesis" notes:
        
        again, materialism is commensurablist about the material, but erroneously therefore incommensurablist about the ideal, supposedly because the ideal is not causal or purposeful, and non-causal existence and non-purposeful value seem incoherent
        • abstract universalism seems concretely occult
          
          (saying abstract entities are really existent sounds like you're claiming something non-empirical is existent)
        • and analytic criticism thus seems synthetically skeptical
          
          (saying the meaning of words isn't a given sounds like you couldn't have any basis at all to claim anything is true)
        • while attributive universalism seems predicatively occult
          
          (saying attributive ends are morally valuable sounds like you're claiming something non-hedonic is valuable)
        • and procedural criticism thus seems distributively skeptical
          
          (saying the ownership of property isn't a given sounds like you couldn't have any basis at all to claim anything is good)
        So contrapositively:
        • abstract relativism seems required by concrete phenomenalism
          (saying that abstract entities are just made up in our minds)
        • and analytic dogmatism seems required by synthetic liberalism
          (saying that words just have to mean whatever it is that they do)
        • while attributive relativism seems required by predicative phenomenalism
          (saying that attributive ends are just made up in our wills)
        • and attributive dogmatism seems required by predicative liberalism
          (saying that property just has to belong to whoever it is that it does)
        but the same distorted view also applies in reverse: idealism is commensurablist about the material, but erroneously therefore incommensurablist about the material, supposedly because the material is not eternal but always changing, and the real truth or moral good being ever-changing seems incoherent
        • concrete universalism seems abstractly occult
          
          (saying concrete entities are really existent sounds like saying something non-empirical is existent, like some property of "concreteness", or some "substance" in which forms inhere)
        • and synthetic criticism thus seems analytically skeptical
          
          (saying synthetic truths cannot be known beyond question sounds like saying nothing actually means anything and anyone can just use any words however, since if we started with clearly-defined meanings then the truth would follow necessarily)
        • while predicative universalism seems analytically occult
          
          (saying predicative ends are morally valuable sounds like saying something non-hedonic is valuable, like some property of "predicativeness", or some "wealth" that success obtains)
        • and distributive criticism thus seems procedurally skeptical
          
          (saying distributive goods cannot be duties beyond question sounds like saying nobody actually owns anything and anyone can just use any property however, since if we started with clearly-defined ownership then the good would follow obligatorily)
        So contrapositively:
        • concrete relativism seems required by abstract phenomenalism
          (saying that what is concretely existent varies from person to person)
        • and synthetic dogmatism seems required by analytic liberalism
          (saying that synthetic truths can be known beyond question)
        • while predicative relativism seems required by distributive phenomenalism
          (saying that what is predicatively valuable varies from person to person)
        • and distributive dogmatism seems required by procedural liberalism
          (saying that distributive goods can be duties beyond question)
        Cover ideal qua private (subjective) / material qua public (fiduciary-institutional) X ideal qua potential / material qua actual here?
        
        Name alternate forms of each principle and anti-principle:
        • • • concrete realism vs concrete relativism
            • abstract realism vs abstract relativism
              • abstract realism is the notion that abstract entities really exist and aren't just made up
              • abstract relativism is the notion that abstract entities are just made up and aren't existent outside the mind
          • • predicative moralism vs predicative relativism
            • attributive moralism vs attributive relativism
              • attributive moralism is the notion that attributive ends are morally valuable and aren't just made up
              • attributive relativism is the notion that attributive ends are just made up and aren't valuable outside the will
        • • • concrete empiricism vs concrete occultism
            • abstract empiricism vs abstract occultism
              • abstract empiricism is the notion that abstract entities seem, and are, concretely existent to those who are part of them; that empirical experience is just what abstract existence looks like in the first person
              • abstract occultism is the notion that abstract entities are some kind of different things than empirically existent concrete entities
          • • predicative hedonism vs predicative occultism
            • attributive hedonism vs attributive occultism
              • phenomenalism about the prescriptive ideal is the notion that attributive ends seem, and are, predicatively valuable to those who are part of them; that hedonic experience is just what attributive value feels like in the first person;
              • attributive occultism is the notion that attributive ends are some kind of different things than hedonically valuable predicative ends
        • • • synthetic criticism vs synthetic dogmatism
            • analytic criticism vs analytic dogmatism
              • analytic criticism is the notion that in analytic truths the meanings of words aren't just immutably given
              • analytic dogmatism is the notion that in analytic truths the meanings of words are some kind of immutable given
          • • distributive criticism vs distributive dogmatism
            • procedural criticism vs procedural dogmatism
              • procedural criticism is the notion that in procedural justice the ownership of property isn't just immutably given
              • procedural dogmatism is the notion that in procedural justice the ownership of property is some kind of immutable given
        • • • synthetic liberalism vs synthetic skepticism
            • analytic liberalism vs analytic skepticism
              • analytic liberalism is the notion that in analytic truths words nevertheless can still mean something
              • analytic skepticism is the notion that in analytic truths nothing actually means anything and anyone can just use any words however
          • • distributive liberalism vs distributive skepticism
            • procedural liberalism vs procedural skepticism
              • procedural liberalism is the notion that in procedural justice property nevertheless can still be owned by someone
              • procedural skepticism is the notion that in procedural justice nobody actually owns anything and anyone can just use any property however
      • Nondualism
        (adapted from current section "Roughly Spiral Progress", and Introduction > Aspiration; mention other concepts like unity of opposites, golden mean, dialectical synthesis, etc)
    • Conclusions
      • On physics and ethics as separate but equal
        (adapted from "A Note On Ethics" > section by that name, preface only)
      • Metaphysics and metaethics (analytic)
        (adapted from "A Note On Ethics" > On Meta-Ethics)
      • Philosophies of nature and nurture (practical)
        (adapted from "A Note On Ethics" > On The Ethical Sciences)
      • The physical and ethical scientific methods
        (adapted from "A Note On Ethics" > subsections of "On physics and ethics as separate but equal", and the parallel sections of Commensurablism)
        Structure each side in four parts:
        • Subjects: we are parts of the universe trying to understand and improve itself
        • Objects: reality and morality are grounded in what looks true and feels good
        • Methods: experiencing more completely and ruling out what isn't consistent
        • Institutes: combining different perspectives independently but cooperatively
• On Action and the Meaning of Life
  • On Action as the Function of a Person
    • Simple events where stimulus just is response
    • (physics and use value go between here)
    • Self-restarting events = persistent objects with basic stimulus-response
    • (chemistry and exchange value go between here)
    • Self-updating objects = state machines
    • (biology and investment value go between here)
    • Feedback-involving state machines = sentience
    • (psychology and control value go between here)
    • Reflective sentience = sapience
    • Behavior
      • Proaction
      • Reaction
    • Thoughts
      • Intention
      • Belief
    • Feelings
      • Desire
      • Perception
    • Experience
      • Appetite
      • Sensation
  • On Meaning as Connectedness
    
    Connections in and connections out; connections with truths and connections with goods; learning, teaching (advising), enjoying, and helping (assisting); or more generally, exploring and creating; either extrinsically to enable some other action, or intrinsically for its own sake: to play, to which end we work, to be safe to have fun.
    • Meaningful experience as learning and enjoying
      
      But what of despair?
      Is there any possible, or even necessary, answer to "why should we go on living?" ("Why to live")
      Any limit to the value of life?
      • Existential angst
      • Peak experiences
      • Feelings aren't truth-apt
    • Meaningful behavior as teaching (advising) and helping (assisting)
      
      But what of futility?
      Is there any possible, or even necessary, answer to "how could we go on living?" ("How to live")
      Any limit to the existence of life?
      • Pessimism
      • Optimism
      • Meliorism
• Prescription
  • On Empowerment, Courage, and Acceptance
    • On Personal Empowerment
    • On Social Empowerment
  • On State, Governance, and the Institutions of Duty
    • • What is a state?
        
        Not just a group of people with shared intentions, but specifically an authoritarian form of governance.
      • What is governance?
    • On Political Legitimacy
      • Against States as Deontic Dogmatism
      • On Stateless Governance
        • On Legislation
        • On Adjudication
        • On Enforcement
    • On the Distribution of Resources
      • On Market vs Command Economies
      • On Usufruct vs Usury
  • On Deontology, Justice, and the Methods of Duty
    • • What is duty?
        
        Intending something that is just, such that if it were not just you would not intend it.
      • What is justice?
    • Distributive Justice
      • Imperfect Duties of Distributive Justice
        (hedonic stuff)
        • Against Consequentialism as Deontic Skepticism
        • On Prudence
        • On Efficiency
      • Perfect Duties of Distributive Justice
        (modified categorical imperative / platinum rule)
        (reinforce something against deontic dogmatism here, to segue into...)
    • Procedural Justice
      • Imperfect Duties of Distributive Justice
        (assignment of ownership to property)
      • Perfect Duties of Procedural Justice
        (adapted from current section on Deontic Rights)
  • On Will, Agency, and the Subjects of Morality
    • • What is will?
      • What is agency?
    • On Regulative Agency
      • Against Incompatibilism as Axial Occultism
        (freedom qua randomness is not valuable)
      • On Compatibilist Will
        • Appetite
        • Desire
        • Intention
    • On Dispositional Agency
      • Against Hard Determinism
      • Against Libertarianism
      • Pan-proto-behavioralism
  • On Axiology, Value, and the Objects of Morality
    • • What is morality?
        
        The ultimate purpose of all behavior, the totality of all value.
      • What is value?
    • Predicative Value
      • Against Occult Axiologies
        • Against Supernurturalism
        • Against Axiological (Occult) Materialism
      • Against Relativist Axiologies
        • Against Egotism
        • Against Axiological (Ephemeral) Idealism
    • Attributive Value
      • Instrumental Emergent Value
        • Use Value
        • Trade Value
        • Investment Value
        • Control Value
      • Aesthetic Value
        • On Beauty
        • On Drama
  • On Rhetoric and the Arts
• Description
  • On Enlightenment, Curiosity, and Bracketing
    • On Personal Enlightenment
    • On Social Enlightenment
  • On Religions, Education, and the Institutions of Knowledge
    • • What is a religion?
        
        Not just a group of people with shared beliefs, but specifically an authoritarian form of education.
      • What is education?
    • On Academic Legitimacy
      • Against Religions as Epistemic Dogmatism
      • On Irreligious Education
        • On Research
        • On Testing
        • On Teaching
    • On the Distribution of Information
      • On Freethinking vs Proselytism
      • On ??? vs ???
  • On Epistemology, Truth, and the Methods of Knowledge
    • • What is knowledge?
        
        Believing something that is true, such that if it were not true you would not believe it.
      • What is truth?
    • Synthetic Truths
      • A Posteriori Knowledge of Synthetic Truths
        (empirical stuff)
        • Against Confirmationism as Epistemic Skepticism
        • On Probability
        • On Parsimony
      • A Priori Knowledge of Synthetic Truths
        (conceivability)
        (reinforce something against epistemic dogmatism here, to segue into...)
    • Analytic Truths
      • A Posteriori Knowledge of Analytic Truths
        (assignment of meaning to words)
      • A Priori Knowledge of Analytic Truths
        (adapted from current section on Epistemic Rights)
  • On Mind, Consciousness, and the Subjects of Reality
    • • What is mind?
      • What is consciousness?
    • Access Consciousness
      • Against Dualism as Ontoic Occultism
      • On Functionalist Mind
        • Sensation
        • Perception
        • Belief
    • Phenomenal Consciousness
      • Against Eliminativism
      • Against Strong Emergentism
      • Pan-proto-experientialism
  • On Ontology, Existence, and the Objects of Reality
    • • What is reality?
        
        The ultimate cause of all experience, the totality of all existence.
      • What is existence?
    • Concrete Existence
      • Against Occult Ontologies
        • Against Supernaturalism
        • Against Ontological (Occult) Materialism
      • Against Relativist Ontologies
        • Against Solipsism
        • Against Ontological (Ephemeral) Idealism
    • Abstract Existence
      • Instrumental Emergent Existence
        • Physical
        • Chemical
        • Biological
        • Psychological
      • Mathematical Existence
        • On Structure
        • On Impossible Objects
  • On Logic and Mathematics
• On Language and the Meaning of Words
• Summary
  • Mathematical multiverse, indexical concrete reality, time as a path toward max-entropy
    Math... physics, chemistry, biology, psychology
  • Panpsychism, then functional consciousness, self-awareness
  • Critical epistemic rights, then synthetic knowledge
  • Information distribution, then academic legitimacy mirroring functional consciousness
  • Using language to do philosophy to do work so we can play
  • Resource distribution, then political legitimacy mirroring functional agency
  • Liberal deontic rights, then distributive justice
  • Panvolitionism, then functional agency, self-control
  • Control value, investment value, exchange value, use value... aesthetic value
    Cosmic art project, indexical predicative morality, time as a path toward min-entropy