Old version here.
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Introduction
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Guided journey through entire world of philosophy
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Novel system for professionals and recap of discourse for novices; something useful in either case
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Four core essays:
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Metaphilosophical conclusions (why philosophy matters and what it is),
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Metaphilosophical analysis (from the outside in, from the inside out, and both forward and backward across time),
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Philosophical analysis (extremely moderate approach, between objectivism and subjectivism, rationalism and fideism),
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Philosophical conclusions (natural sciences are better than what we did before, and nurtural sciences would be better than what we do now).
Metaphilosophical analysis the greatest analytic novelty here,
with nurtural sciences the biggest underdeveloped piece of that picture,
and thus the most practical takeaway here.
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Then topic-by-topic breakdown from the meaning of life to the meaning of words
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Apology for audacity
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The Basics
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The Metaphilosophy of Analytic Pragmatism
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Conclusions
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Why is philosophy useful?
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Distantly instrumental to all endeavors
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All work
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Administration
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Technologists administer tools
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Businesspeople administer jobs
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Creation
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Engineers create technologies
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Entrepreneurs create businesses
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Sciences
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Physical sciences inform engineering
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Ethical sciences should inform entrepreneurship
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Philosophy undergirds both the physical and ethical sciences
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Ontology, epistemology, etc undergird the physical sciences
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Axiology, deontology, etc undergird the ethical sciences
(including start of current Introduction > Motivation)
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Also intrinsic practice at being a person
"Martial arts for the mind and will"
(including current Introduction > Overview > Dogen and infection stuff)
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Can philosophy get done at all?
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Yes, it has: the physical sciences
(separating education and the investigation of truth from religion,
and connecting the learning of deep truths to the development of practical technologies)
are both mostly logically mustered and mostly rhetorically disseminated
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And it still can more: the ethical sciences
(separating governance and the accomplishment of good from state,
and connecting the achievement of high goods to the development of practical businesses)
are only haphazardly progressing in both their mustering and dissemination
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What does it take to do philosophy?
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Consciousness, curiosity, and bracketing (to do the logical mustering of philosophical solutions)
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Agency, courage, and serenity (to do the rhetorical dissemination of those solutions to an unreceptive world)
These are both the muscles needed to do it and those that will get grown by doing it.
(including current Introduction > Overview > maybe hopeless but trying anyway?)
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How is philosophy to be done?
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Analytically and pragmatically
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Historically (where it's coming from) and dialectically (where that's all going)
(including current
Introduction > History, and
Introduction > Motivation > "tried on")
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Who is to do philosophy?
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Everyone (disseminating) and professionals (mustering)
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Generalists (disseminating) and specialists (mustering)
(including current Introduction > Motivation > dependencies, parallel solutions)
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What even is philosophy?
The investigation of broad and fundamental things
But demarcation problem
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Not religion
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Not sophistry
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Not science
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Not politics
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Not math
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Not art
None of those, but rather the bridge from the abstract arts and mathematics,
to the physical and ethical sciences; from abstract to concrete, and descriptive and prescriptive.
About useful ways of talking about things,
or rather avoiding counter-productive ways of talking about things,
like either religion or sophistry; productive or useful toward
the ability to tell superior answer from inferior ones,
which is wisdom, which philosophy is the love or pursuit of.
(therefore... current Introduction > Overview > that common error + the general worldview + my phil is the view that ...)
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Arguments
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The Four Aspects (of "meaning?")
Derivative of Aristotle's four "causes"
But not actually based directly on that;
just two dichotomies found repeatedly all across philosophy.
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Hylomorphism
Potential-actual distinction
Ideal-material distinction
Noumenal-phenomenal distinction
Essential-existential distinction
Quiddity-haecceity distinction
Morphic-hylic distinction
Basically stems all the way back to Thales, the first instance of supposing everything may be different forms of the same material.
He said water; Anaximander said instead no particular known material, but some indefinite, or boundless, stuff.
Pythagoras effectively said why bother with materials at all if there's no distinctions between them: it's all just forms.
For my part I think Pythagoras more or less nailed it in three.
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Potential
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Form is external connection
(presages prescriptive)
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Structure is internal connection
(presages descriptive)
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Function is through-connection, external to internal to external, and synchronic identity
(presages indexical)
Linguistic meaning as graphs of connections between forms or within structures
No distinction between invention and discovery yet
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Actual
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Input to our functions as experience
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Output from our functions as behavior
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Reflexive internal function, self-experience and self-behavior, as diachronic identity
Practical meaning as indexical connection through our own function
Distinction between invention and discovery arises
Form is the experience of function
Function is the behavior of structure
Structure is the reflexion of form
We can take formless, functionless, structureless "atoms" (of, say, empty sets),
and reflexively build structures out of them,
which structures can behave in functional ways,
the experiences of which functions are forms,
which can be built into still further structures.
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Direction of fit
Descriptive-prescriptive distinction
Is-ought distinction
Fact-norm distinction
Plato's demiurge/phytourge, "artificial"/"natural", distinction.
"It was made to do this" vs "it did this on its own".
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Descriptive
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Potential inputs restrict the actual
(the past restricts the present, us):
it makes us be this way
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If our model and the world don't match,
our model is to be changed based on our experiences to match the world
(which does not preclude us also changing the world through our behaviors)
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Doing so gives us the tools by which we in the present can direct the future
(the actual restricting potential outputs):
it is the source of our power, how we do anything
The relationship across which potentials actualize things is causation
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Prescriptive
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The actual restricts potential inputs
(we, the present, restrict the past):
it lets us to be this way
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If our model and the world don't match,
the world is to be changed through our behavior to match our model
(which does not preclude us also changing our model based on our experiences)
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Doing so is the job toward which the future directs us in the present
(potential outputs restricting the actual):
it is the source of our responsibility, why we do anything
The relationship across which things actualize their potentials is purpose
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The Eight Domains
We can map the intersections of all three of these subsets of the ideas onto the surface of a sphere,
ringing the borders of each around its equator and two orthogonal meridians, respectively.
This gives us eight domains of consideration, each one an octant of the surface of the sphere.
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One octant represents domain of ideas considered without concern for their
descriptivity, prescriptivity, or indexicality: those that are neither
restricted by their inputs, restricted by their outputs, nor restricted by
whether they actually matter in any particular functional chain.
This is the domain of pure language, for which we can invent any arbitrary rules,
and which we can use toward any arbitrary goal.
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Two sides of that octant border other octants that each respectively represent
the domains of ideas considered with concern for their descriptivity or prescriptivity
-- for how they are restricted by their inputs, or by their outputs --
but without concern for their indexicality, for whether they actually matter in any particular functional chain.
These are the domains of math and the arts, extending from language respectively
via logic's focus on applying the selected syntactical rules,
and rhetoric's focus on attaining the selected pragmatic goals.
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Those two octants in turn jointly border the fourth octant on that hemisphere, to which we will return in a moment,
but also separately border the domains of ideas considered not only with concern for their descriptivity or prescriptivity
-- for whether they are restricted by their inputs, or by their outputs --
but also with concern for their indexicality, for whether they actually matter in any particular functional chain.
These are the domains of the physical and ethical sciences.
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And those in turn jointly border both the octant exactly opposite the one we skipped just before,
to which we will also return in a moment, as well as the octant exactly opposite the one we began with:
the domain of ideas considered with concern for their indexicality
-- for how they actually matter in this particular functional chain --
as well as with how they are restricted by both their inputs and by their outputs.
This is the domain of work, of all practical activities.
This ring -- from language, through descriptive and prescriptive topics, both abstract and practical, all the way around to work --
frames those two last yet-unaddressed octants, opposite each other, like the faces of a coin with this ring as its edge.
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On one side is the fourth octant we skipped before, the domain of ideas considered with concern
for their descriptivity and prescriptivity both
-- for how they are restricted by their inputs and by their outputs --
but without concern for their indexicality, for
whether they actually matter in any particular functional chain.
This is the domain of philosophy, considering both the true and the good, reality and morality,
but in an abstract and general matter detached from any particular practical concerns.
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And on the side exactly opposite philosophy is
the domain of ideas considered with concern for their indexicality
-- for how they actually matter in this particular functional chain --
but without concern for their descriptivity or prescriptivity,
for whether they are restricted by their inputs and by their outputs.
This is the domain of concrete action in the actual world, but without limits
either on how to do it or why to do it, where the goals and the rules are
as made up as those of pure language: the domain of play.
Every game is defined by its rules and its goals, as well as its players and its judges.
The notions of rules and of goals correspond to the powers and responsibilities of the
descriptive and prescriptive domains, exhibiting a nondual pattern
that shows up throughout philosophy, such as in modality:
rules concern what is impossible/impermissible or possible/permissible, setting out what tools players can (or can't) use;
while goals concern what is necessary/obligatory or contingent/omissible, setting out what jobs they must (or don't have to) do.
Many of the relations between different fields above can be framed therefore as parts of games:
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Language is a game with its syntax as its tools and its pragmatics as its job;
math is consequently the sub-game concerning the rules of language,
and the arts are the sub-game concerning the goals of language.
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Work is a game with reality as it tools and morality as its job;
the physical sciences are consequently the sub-game concerning the rules of work,
and the ethical sciences are the sub-game concerning the goals of work.
Play, meanwhile, inherently produces what is effectively linguistic meaning,
as 'moves' in whatever games we produce -- be they literal body movements, sounds we make,
scratches in the dirt or on rocks or wood or paper, tokens of some kind we move about, whatever --
take on significance, importance, meaning (semantics),
from the rules we apply to them (a syntax) and the goals we pursue with them (a pragmatics).
And also, as we are thrown into the world, we discover that in order to be free to do that kind of language-inventing play,
there is a mandatory game we must play, the game of life, of work, where we are not told the rules or the goals
but we will still fail and never get to play anything again if we don't figure them out and then attain those goals
within the confines of those rules.
That makes playing, in general, itself a kind of meta-game, where the goal is effectively to produce language, to create meaning,
and the rule is you have to do the work to enable yourself to keep playing.
Meanwhile, on the other side of the coin, the philosophy side, we can frame the whole philosophical endeavor as a similar kind of meta-game,
the game whose goal is to enable work to be done, to serve the jobs of the physical and ethical sciences,
and whose rule is to operate within the confines of language, to use the tools math and the arts, logic and rhetoric
-- all of that ultimately using the tool of play, in its language-creating capacity, to do the job of play, inasmuch as it is enabled by work.
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The Sixteen Topics
If we thus delve deeper into the sub-games of philosophy, and the sub-games thereof, and so on deeper into the details,
we should be able to find both all of jobs set out before philosophy, all of the questions it is supposed to answer,
as well as all of the tools at its disposal, all of the means of answering such questions:
Level 1:
The split of abstract potentiality of language from concrete actuality of work.
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Philosophy ...
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... serves the jobs / goals / objects of work
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... uses the tools / rules / methods of language
Level 2:
The split into descriptive and prescriptive.
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[Philosophy]
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Work ...
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... serves the jobs / goals / objects of the ethical sciences
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... uses the tools / rules / methods of the physical sciences
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Language ...
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... serves the jobs / goals / objects of the arts
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... uses the tools / rules / methods of mathematics
Level 3:
The split into entities and methods.
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[Philosophy]
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[Work]
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The ethical sciences ...
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... serve the jobs / goals / objects of morality(?)
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... use the tools / rules / methods of justice(?)
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The physical sciences ...
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... serve the jobs / goals / objects of reality(?)
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... use the tools / rules / methods of knowledge(?)
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[Language]
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The arts ...
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... serve the jobs / goals / objects of integrability(?)
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... use the tools / rules / methods of concordance(?)
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Mathematics ...
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... serves the jobs / goals / objects of derivability(?)
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... uses the tools / rules / methods of coherence(?)
Level 4:
The split of what from who, objects from subjects, reasons/methods from fiduciaries/institutions.
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[Philosophy]
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[Work]
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[The ethical sciences]
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Morality(?) ...
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... serves the jobs / goals / objects of axiology
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... uses the tools / rules / methods of will
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Justice(?) ...
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... serves the jobs / goals / objects of deontology
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... uses the tools / rules / methods of governance
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[The physical sciences]
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Reality(?) ...
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... serves the jobs / goals / objects of ontology
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... uses the tools / rules / methods of mind
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Knowledge(?) ...
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... serves the jobs / goals / objects of epistemology
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... uses the tools / rules / methods of education
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[Language]
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[The arts]
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Integrability(?) ...
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... serves the jobs / goals / objects of integrability(?)
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... uses the tools / rules / methods of creativeness
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Concordance(?) ...
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... serves the jobs / goals / objects of concordance(?)
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... uses the tools / rules / methods of daring(?)
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[Mathematics]
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Derivability(?) ...
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... serves the jobs / goals / objects of derivability(?)
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... uses the tools / rules / methods of explorativeness(?)
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Coherence(?) ...
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... serves the jobs / goals / objects of coherence(?)
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... uses the tools / rules / methods of audacity(?)
Level 5:
The split along lines of actuality and potentiality, concrete and abstract, etc
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[Philosophy]
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[Work]
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[The ethical sciences]
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[Morality(?)]
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Axiology ...
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... serves the jobs / goals / objects of predicative value
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... uses the tools / rules / methods of attributive value
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Will ...
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... serves the jobs / goals / objects of dispositional agency
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... uses the tools / rules / methods of regulative agency
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[Justice(?)]
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Deontology
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... serves the jobs / goals / objects of distributive justice
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... uses the tools / rules / methods of procedural justice
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Governance ...
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... serves the jobs / goals / objects of resource distribution
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... uses the tools / rules / methods of political legitimacy
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[The physical sciences]
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[Reality(?)]
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Ontology ...
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... serves the jobs / goals / objects of concrete existence
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... uses the tools / rules / methods of abstract existence
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Mind ...
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... serves the jobs / goals / objects of phenomenal consciousness
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... uses the tools / rules / methods of access consciousness
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[Knowledge(?)]
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Epistemology ...
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... serves the jobs / goals / objects of synthetic truth
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... uses the tools / rules / methods of analytic truth
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Education ...
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... serves the jobs / goals / objects of information distribution
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... uses the tools / rules / methods of academic legitimacy
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[Language]
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[The arts]
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[Integrability(?)]
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Integrability(?) ...
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... serves the jobs / goals / objects of minimizing servility
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... uses the tools / rules / methods of maximizing utility
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Creativeness ...
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... serves the jobs / goals / objects of artistic imagination(?)
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... uses the tools / rules / methods of artistic literacy(?)
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[Concordance(?)]
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Concordance(?) ...
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... serves the jobs / goals / objects of cooperation
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... uses the tools / rules / methods of independence
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Daring(?) ...
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... serves the jobs / goals / objects of courage
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... uses the tools / rules / methods of serenity
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[Mathematics]
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[Derivability(?)]
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Derivability(?) ...
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... serves the jobs / goals / objects of minimizing necessity
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... uses the tools / rules / methods of maximizing sufficiency
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Explorativeness(?) ...
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... serves the jobs / goals / objects of mathematical imagination(?)
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... uses the tools / rules / methods of mathematical literacy(?)
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[Coherence(?)]
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Coherence(?) ...
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... serves the jobs / goals / objects of completeness
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... uses the tools / rules / methods of consistency
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Audacity(?) ...
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... serves the jobs / goals / objects of curiosity
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... uses the tools / rules / methods of bracketing
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All of this hinges on time:
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the potential is all eternal, timeless
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the actual is the temporal, seen from a particular time
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the descriptive is defined by the past restricting the future
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the prescriptive is defined by the future restricting the past
There are multiple ways to construe time in terms of informational entropy,
partial orderings across the abstract space of forms/functions/structures,
with the two extremes of those ways corresponding to descriptive and prescriptive orderings
(a way things will go if they must, and a way things would go if they could)
which can thus be framed in terms of rules and goals too
(the overarching rule is max-entropy always increases,
and the overarching goal is to increase min-entropy);
and the spectrum of them orthogonal to each other presages the core principle of commensurablism.
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The Philosophy of Commensurablism
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Arguments
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Introduction > Overview > the general worldview...
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Pragmatism: trying, vs giving up
(adapted from current section "Pragmatic Justificiation")
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First synthesis: meliorism, vs narrow optimism or pessimism
(adapted from part of current section "The Opposition")
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Second synthesis: "commensurablism" qua critico-liberal universal phenomenalism
(broad objectivism, broad subjectivism, broad rationalism, and broad fideism),
vs "modernism" qua occult skepticism,
or "postmodernism" qua dogmatic relativism
(narrow objectivism and narrow fideism, or narrow rationalism and narrow subjectivism)
(adapted from most of current essay and the other part of current section "The Opposition")
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(Here in the middle, mention the analogy of
objectivism : subjectivism : fideism : rationalism
::
objects : subjects : fiduciaries (institutions) : reasons (methods)
::
goals : players : judges : rules ;
but that there are the four different 'games' to apply that to, the physical and ethical sciences as well as mathematics and the arts,
the neglect of any of which would constitute giving up on that question).
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Applying this to both descriptive and prescriptive questions,
vs both scientism and
constructivism politicism from current essay "On Cynicism", and parts of intro.
the "anti-postmodernist" universalism and criticism seem like "narrowly optimistic" dogmatic occultism:
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universalism about prescriptive things seems occult against a phenomenalism grounded in the descriptive
(saying there is objective as in universal morality sounds like you're claiming something non-empirical exists)
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criticism about prescriptive things seems dogmatic against a liberalism grounded in the descriptive
(saying that some things are against objective as in universal moral rules sounds like an appeal to faith -- since objective morality already seems occult)
while the "anti-modernist" phenomenalism and liberalism seem like "narrowly pessimistic" skeptical relativism:
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phenomenalism about prescriptive things seems relativist against a universalism grounded in the descriptive
(saying that morality is based on hedonic experiences sounds like you're claiming it varies person to person)
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liberalism about prescriptive things seems skeptical against a criticism grounded in the descriptive
(saying that everything is permissible so long as nobody gets hurt sounds like saying there are no objective moral rules -- since hurting already seems relative)
but the same distorted view also applies in reverse to the politicist looking at the scientistic project: to the politicist, the ontic realist
seems to hold occult values (beyond hedonism) about this scientistic project,
hold those dogmatically (as all occult views must be held),
yet also seems to be a relativist for demanding evidence available to their own senses over others' lived (hedonic) experience,
and a (moral) skeptic for following supposedly 'value-free' research to whatever harmful conclusions it might lead
Name alternate forms of each principle and anti-principle:
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ontic universalism or "realism" vs ontic relativism, and axial universalism or "moralism" vs axial relativism
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ontic phenomenalism or "empiricism" vs ontic occultism, and axial phenomenalism or "hedonism" vs axial occultism
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epistemic criticism vs epistemic dogmatism, and deontic criticism vs deontic dogmatism
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epistemic liberalism vs epistemic skepticism, and deontic liberalism vs deontic skepticism
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And applying to both indexical and non-indexical questions, vs yet-unnamed "material only" or "ideal only" positions, a la "third synthesis" notes:
again, the "anti-postmodernist" universalism and criticism seem like "narrowly optimistic" dogmatic occultism:
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universalism about "ideal" things seems occult against a phenomenalism grounded in the "material"
[universalism about the ideal is the notion that abstract entities really exist, and attributive goods are morally valuable]
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criticism about the "ideal" seems dogmatic against a liberalism grounded in the "material"
(since objectivity about the ideal already seems occult)
[criticism about the ideal is the notion that we can prove what kinds of abstract things do or don't exist]
while the "anti-modernist" phenomenalism and liberalism seem like "narrowly pessimistic" skeptical relativism:
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phenomenalism about the "ideal" seems relativist against a universalism grounded in the "material"
[phenomenalism about the ideal is the notion that abstract entities seem, and are, concrete to those who are part of them]
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liberalism about the "ideal" seems skeptical against a criticism grounded in the "material"
(since phenomenalism about the ideal already seems relativist)
[liberalism about the ideal is the notion that axioms are arbitrary and we can make up any that we want]
but the same distorted view also applies in reverse to the "ideal-only" view looking at the "material-only" project...
Name alternate forms of each principle and anti-principle:
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concrete realism vs concrete relativism (the ordinary kinds above),
predicative moralism vs predicative relativism (the ordinary kinds above),
abstract realism vs abstract relativism (abstract entities aren't just made up),
attributive moralism vs attributive relativism (attributive goods aren't just made up)
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concrete empiricism vs concrete occultism (the ordinary kinds above),
predicative hedonism vs predicative occultism (the ordinary kinds above),
abstract empiricism(?) vs abstract occultism (we can test what abstractly exists? or, it's the same kind of thing as concrete existence?),
attributive hedonism(?) vs attributive occultism (we can test what's attributively valuable? or, it's the same kind of thing as predicative value?)
-
synthetic epistemic criticism vs synthetic epistemic dogmatism (the ordinary kinds above),
distributive deontic criticism vs distributive deontic dogmatism (the ordinary kinds above),
analytic epistemic criticism vs analytic epistemic dogmatism,
procedural deontic criticism vs procedural deontic dogmatism,
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synthetic epistemic liberalism vs synthetic epistemic skepticism (the ordinary kinds above),
distributive deontic liberalism vs distributive deontic skepticism (the ordinary kinds above),
analytic epistemic liberalism vs analytic epistemic skepticism,
procedural deontic liberalism vs procedural deontic skepticism
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Nondualism
(adapted from current section "Roughly Spiral Progress", and Introduction > Aspiration)
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Conclusions
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On physics and ethics as separate but equal
(adapted from "A Note On Ethics" > section by that name, preface only)
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Metaphysics and metaethics (analytic)
(adapted from "A Note On Ethics" > On Meta-Ethics)
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Philosophies of nature and nurture (practical)
(adapted from "A Note On Ethics" > On The Ethical Sciences)
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The physical and ethical scientific methods
(adapted from "A Note On Ethics" > subsections of "On physics and ethics as separate but equal", and the parallel sections of Commensurablism)
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On Action and the Meaning of Life
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On Action as the Function of a Person
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Simple events where stimulus just is response
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(physics and use value go between here)
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Self-restarting events = persistent objects with basic stimulus-response
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(chemistry and exchange value go between here)
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Self-updating objects = state machines
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(biology and investment value go between here)
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Feedback-involving state machines = sentience
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(psychology and control value go between here)
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Reflective sentience = sapience
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Behavior
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Manipulation
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Communication
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Thoughts
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Feelings
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Experience
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On Meaning as Connectedness
Connections in and connections out;
connections with truths and connections with goods;
learning, teaching (advising), enjoying, and helping (assisting);
or more generally, exploring and creating;
either extrinsically to enable some other action,
or intrinsically for its own sake:
to play, to which end we work,
to be safe to have fun.
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Meaningful experience as learning and enjoying
But what of despair?
Is there any possible, or even necessary, answer to
"why should we go on living?"
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Existential angst
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Peak experiences
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Feelings aren't truth-apt
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Meaningful behavior as teaching (advising) and helping (assisting)
But what of futility?
Is there any possible, or even necessary, answer to
"how could we go on living?"
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Pessimism
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Optimism
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Meliorism
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Prescription
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On Empowerment, Courage, and Acceptance
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On Personal Empowerment
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On Social Empowerment
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On Governance, State, and the Institutions of Duty
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On Political Legitimacy
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Against States as Deontic Dogmatism
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On Stateless Governance
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On Legislation
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On Adjudication
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On Enforcement
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On the Distribution of Resources
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On Market vs Command Economies
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On Usufruct vs Usury
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On Deontology, Justice, and the Methods of Duty
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Distributive Justice
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Imperfect Duties of Distributive Justice
(hedonic stuff)
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Against Consequentialism as Deontic Skepticism
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On Prudence
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On Efficiency
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Perfect Duties of Distributive Justice
(modified categorical imperative / platinum rule)
(reinforce something against deontic dogmatism here, to segue into...)
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Procedural Justice
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Perfect Duties of Procedural Justice
(adapted from current section on Deontic Rights)
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Imperfect Duties of Distributive Justice
(assignment of ownership to property)
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On Will, Agency, and the Subjects of Morality
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On Regulative Agency
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Against Incompatibilism as Axial Occultism
(freedom qua randomness is not valuable)
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On Compatibilist Will
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Appetite
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Desire
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Intention
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On Dispositional Agency
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Against Causal Determinism
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Against Agent Causation
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Pan-proto-behavioralism
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On Axiology, Value, and the Objects of Morality
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Predicative Value
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Against Occult Axiologies
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Against Supernurturalism
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Against Axiological (Occult) Materialism
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Against Relativist Axiologies
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Against Egotism
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Against Axiological (Ephemeral) Idealism
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Attributive Value
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Instrumental Emergent Value
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Use Value
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Trade Value
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Investment Value
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Control Value
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Aesthetic Value
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On Rhetoric and the Arts
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Description
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On Enlightenment, Curiosity, and Bracketing
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On Personal Enlightenment
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On Social Enlightenment
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On Education, Religion, and the Institutions of Knowledge
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On Academic Legitimacy
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Against Religions as Epistemic Dogmatism
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On Irreligious Education
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On Research
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On Testing
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On Teaching
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On the Distribution of Information
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On Freethinking vs Proselytism
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On ??? vs ???
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On Epistemology, Truth, and the Methods of Knowledge
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Synthetic Truths
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A Posteriori Knowledge of Synthetic Truths
(empirical stuff)
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Against Confirmationism as Epistemic Skepticism
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On Probability
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On Parsimony
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A Priori Knowledge of Synthetic Truths
(conceivability)
(reinforce something against epistemic dogmatism here, to segue into...)
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Analytic Truths
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A Priori Knowledge of Analytic Truths
(adapted from current section on Epistemic Rights)
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A Posteriori Knowledge of Analytic Truths
(assignment of meaning to words)
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On Mind, Consciousness, and the Subjects of Reality
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Access Consciousness
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Against Dualism
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On Functionalist Mind
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Sensation
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Perception
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Belief
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Phenomenal Consciousness
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Against Eliminativism
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Against Strong Emergentism
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Pan-proto-experientialism
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On Ontology, Existence, and the Objects of Reality
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Concrete Existence
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Against Occult Ontologies
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Against Supernaturalism
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Against Ontological (Occult) Materialism
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Against Relativist Ontologies
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Against Solipsism
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Against Ontological (Ephemeral) Idealism
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Abstract Existence
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Instrumental Emergent Existence
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Physical
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Chemical
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Biological
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Psychological
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Mathematical Existence
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On Structure
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On Impossible Objects
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On Logic and Mathematics
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On Language and the Meaning of Words
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Summary
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Mathematical multiverse, indexical concrete reality, time as a path toward max-entropy
Math... physics, chemistry, biology, psychology
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Panpsychism, then functional consciousness, self-awareness
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Critical epistemic rights, then synthetic knowledge
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Information distribution, then academic legitimacy mirroring functional consciousness
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Using language to do philosophy to do work so we can play
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Resource distribution, then political legitimacy mirroring functional agency
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Liberal deontic rights, then distributive justice
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Panvolitionism, then functional agency, self-control
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Control value, investment value, exchange value, use value... aesthetic value
Cosmic art project, indexical predicative morality, time as a path toward min-entropy